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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps one of the world’s greatest mysteries is what ingredients 
comprise the recipe for Coca-Cola.  This recipe sits in a vault in Atlanta, 
Georgia with a palm scanner, numerical code, and large steel door.1  Once 
inside the vault, there is another safe box and metal case that store what the 
owners call “the most guarded trade secret in the world.”2  Only two senior 
executives know the recipe at any given time, and they are not allowed to 
travel on the same plane.3  The great lengths Coca-Cola goes through to 
guard its secret recipe indicate the importance of protecting trade secrets.  
Recently, there has been an increase in attempted trade secret thefts, 
especially as technology advances.  In 2010, a research chemist stole trade 
secrets worth $400 million and passed them to a Chinese university.4  In 
2011, a former Ford employee copied over four thousand documents worth 
$50 million onto a hard drive.5  In 2012, a former General Motors employee 
was found guilty of trying to pass trade secrets related to hybrid cars to a 
Chinese automobile company.6  Theft of trade secrets costs U.S. companies 
billions of dollars every year.7  These instances are just a few of the 
examples that prompted both the United States and the European Union (EU) 
to draft and adopt trade secret legislation.  
The object of this Note is to understand the similarities and differences 
between recent trade secret legislation passed in the United States and the 
EU.  Both pieces of legislation seek to obtain similar trade secret protection 
between the two major economies. Although the EU and United States have 
passed similar measures to protect trade secrets, trade secret protection 
remains stronger in the United States. 
This Note will first analyze the history of trade secret protection in both 
the United States and the EU.  This Note will then look at the similarities and 
differences between the recently enacted legislation in the United States and 
the EU.  Next, it analyzes the differences in the effects of the United States’ 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Ivana Kottoasova, Does Formula Mystery Help Keep Coke Afloat?, CNN (Feb. 19, 
2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/18/business/coca-cola-secret-formula/.  
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON MITIGATING 
THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS 5 (2013), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/file/9383 
21/download. 
 5 Id. at 8. 
 6 Id. at 11.  
 7 BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43174, PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS: 
OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATION (2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R4 
3714.pdf. 
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legislation and the EU’s directive.  Finally, this Note will consider whether 
the legislation will lead to uniformity in trade secret protection in both 
jurisdictions.   
II.  BACKGROUND ON TRADE SECRET PROTECTION 
In order to provide a deeper understanding of the trade secrets legislation 
in each world power, it is important to understand the trade secret protections 
that already existed in both the United States and the EU.  Many states in the 
United States adopted similar provisions for trade secret protection, whereas 
many countries in the EU had extremely different, or non-existent, 
approaches to trade secret protection.8  This section will explore the concept 
of a trade secret and the type of information that qualifies as a trade secret.  
This section will then explore the history of trade secret protection in the 
United States as a source for comparing the recently adopted legislation.  
Subsequently, this section will explain trade secret protection as it exists in 
the EU as foundation to analyze the effects of the recently adopted 
legislation.  
A.  What is a Trade Secret and Why Do They Matter?  
The first element of analyzing trade secret legislation is defining a trade 
secret.  According to the Restatement of Torts, “[a] trade secret may consist 
of any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information which is used 
in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage 
over competitors who do not know or use it.”9  A trade secret is typically “a 
process or device for continuous use in the operation of the business” that 
relates to the production of goods.10  Trade secrets can include “customer 
lists, proprietary technologies, formulas and codes, manufacturing processes, 
recipes . . . sensitive product and marketing plans, research and development, 
and other business information” that can provide a competitive advantage 
because of its confidentiality.11  These examples of trade secrets derive their 
value not only from the information itself but also the secrecy of the 
information.12  Trade secrets are important because they help companies 
                                                                                                                   
 8 Natalja Sosnova, EU Directive Proposal: Trade Secrets, 20 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
45, 47 (2016). 
 9 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939). 
 10 Id. 
 11 3M et al., Letter from 36 Organizations with an Interest in Trade Secret Protection to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-
16/s70616-352.pdf [hereinafter Hearings from Organizations]. 
 12 Id. 
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distinguish themselves from competitors and create advantages in the 
industry.13  If a competitor acquires a company’s trade secret, that company 
loses the value of its secret and the competitor gains an advantage by having 
access to information they did not develop, thereby eliminating the trade 
secret owner’s incentive to invest in innovations.14  
The importance of trade secrets has grown in the global economy.  
Though it is difficult to value just how much trade secrets are worth, 81% of 
the total value of S&P 500 companies can be attributed to intangible assets 
like trade secrets and other forms of intellectual property.15  A primary 
reason for the growing importance of trade secrets is new technology.16  In 
today’s world, a thief can simply upload files onto a hard drive and deliver 
that information anywhere in the world, rather than stealing physical files or 
prototypes.  Trade secret theft is also growing because hackers have the 
ability to access confidential company information17 which has become a 
growing concern because some developing countries use trade secret theft as 
a means of economic growth.18  Additionally, trade secrets are rising in 
importance precisely because of the term’s broad definition—the definition 
is “perfectly suited to the evolutionary . . . and revolutionary . . . nature of 
innovation.”19  Finally, trade secrets are attractive to companies because they 
are less costly than patents and require less formality.20  Companies risk 
losing their patent information if their application is denied by the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office, but they do not risk losing their trade secret 
because it is not on the application.21  
B.  History of Trade Secret Protection in the United States   
The United States has a strong background in intellectual property and the 
protection of trade secrets.  Historically, the U.S. government gave patents 
and copyrights stronger protection than trade secrets; however, in 1939, trade 
                                                                                                                   
 13 Daliah Saper, Confidential Information: The Importance of Keeping Trade Secrets, 
BUSINESS.COM (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.business.com/legal/the-importance-of-keeping-sec 
rets-trade-secrets-that-is/. 
 14 Hearings from Organizations, supra note 11.  
 15 David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly Important, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091, 1093 (2012). 
 16 Id. at 1098–1101. 
 17 Id. at 1100. 
 18 Id. at 1110.  
 19 Id. at 1008. 
 20 Id. at 1116. 
 21 Id. at 1115–16.  “A regular US Patent application will be published eighteen months after 
filing.  If . . . a patent application . . . does not mature into an issued patent, they have neither 
trade secret nor patent protection.” 
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secrets entered the intellectual property scene when the Restatement of Torts 
addressed trade secrets in two sections.22  In particular, companies used trade 
secret law to protect information that was outside the scope of traditional 
intellectual property law23 or to avoid the disclosure of patented information 
after twenty years.24  Another advantage to trade secret protection is that it is 
easier, quicker, and cheaper to obtain compared to patent protection.25 
The increased use of trade secrets led to the publication of the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) in 1979 to facilitate uniform trade secret 
protection among states.26  Forty-eight states have adopted the UTSA.27  The 
UTSA was published by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Law with the intent “to codify the basic principles of common 
law trade secrets protection” and promote uniformity, simplicity, and fairness 
in the resolution of trade secret issues.28  Under the UTSA, information 
qualifies as a trade secret if three requirements are met: (1) it must be 
information; (2) it must “have actual or potential ‘independent economic 
value’ stemming from its secrecy”; and, (3) it must have “been the object of 
reasonable efforts designed to maintain its secrecy.”29  The UTSA guidelines 
provide that a trade secret owner has no remedy unless the secret has been 
misappropriated.30  Misappropriation under the UTSA occurs when 
information is obtained by improper means including: theft, bribery, 
misrepresentation, breach, or inducement of a breach of duty to maintain 
secrecy or espionage.31  According to the UTSA, a trade secret owner may 
receive injunctive relief and damages if their trade secret is 
misappropriated.32  A trade secret owner may bring an action for 
misappropriation within three years after the misappropriation was 
discovered or should have been discovered.33  Thus, the UTSA provides a 
way for trade secret owners to ensure uniformity in the protection of trade 
                                                                                                                   
 22 YEH, supra note 7.  
 23 Robert C. Van Arnam, Comment, Business War: Economic Espionage in the United 
States and the European Union and the Need for Greater Trade Secret Protection, 27 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 95, 100–101 (2001). 
 24 YEH, supra note 7.  
 25 Id.  
 26 Rosaria A. Suriano & Mark A. Fantin, Protecting Your Business Assets, INDUSTRYWEEK 
(Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.industryweek.com/intellectual-property/protecting-your-busines 
s-assets. 
 27 Id.  
 28 Ramon A. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277, 284 (1980).  
 29 Id. at 285. 
 30 Id. at 293. 
 31 Id. at 294.  
 32 Id. at 301. 
 33 Id. at 306. 
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secrets from state to state.  Overall, the UTSA has been widely accepted 
based on the fact that only New York and Massachusetts have not adopted 
the Act.34  However, it is important to note that though the UTSA provides a 
strong foundation for the protection of trade secrets, it is only applicable in 
state courts or federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction.35  
While the UTSA permitted trade secret owners to have a civil remedy 
against trade secret misappropriation in state court, the Economic Espionage 
Act of 1996 (EEA) made trade secret misappropriation a federal crime.36  
Congress passed the EEA due to concerns that foreign countries were 
stealing trade secrets from American companies, thereby reducing American 
economic power.37  Prior to the EEA’s enactment, prosecutors brought trade 
secret theft charges under mail fraud statutes.38  
The EEA was the first criminal law in the United States to protect trade 
secrets.  The EEA criminalizes the theft of trade secrets for the benefit of a 
foreign entity or with an intention to confer an economic benefit to another 
party.39  Only intentional violations of trade secret theft are punishable under 
the EEA.40  Penalties under the EEA include a maximum prison sentence of 
fifteen years and a maximum fine of $500,000 for an individual.41  An 
organization that violates the law could receive a maximum fine of $10 
million.42 
C.  History of Trade Secret Protection in the European Union   
In contrast with the United States’ fairly uniform application of trade 
secret law due to most states’ adoption of the UTSA, a 2013 study found no 
uniform definition of trade secrets among the European Union’s member 
states.43  Each of the twenty-eight member states has a different definition of 
“trade secret” and different protections for trade secrets, but the Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the Protection 
                                                                                                                   
 34 Suriano & Fantin, supra note 26; Trade Secrets Act Enactment Status Map, UNIFORM LAW 
COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=trade%20Secrets%20Act (last visited Oct. 
25, 2017).  
 35 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 13.02 (2015). 
 36 Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2017).  
 37 Robin L. Kuntz, Cyberlaw: How Not to Catch A Thief: Why the Economic Espionage Act 
Fails to Protect American Trade Secrets, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 901, 902–03 (2013).  
 38 Id. at 904.  
 39 YEH, supra note 7.  
 40 Van Arnam, supra note 23, at 110. 
 41 Kuntz, supra note 37, at 906. 
 42 Id. at 907. 
 43 For the purposes of this Note, the United Kingdom is analyzed as a part of the European 
Union as the withdrawal was not yet complete.  
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of Undisclosed Know-How and Business Information (Trade Secrets) 
Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, Use and Disclosure (Directive) aims to 
change this disjunction.44 
Historically, the common view was that trade secrets did not deserve the 
same level of protection as other intellectual property rights.45  A European 
Commission report showed that fewer trade secret actions were heard by the 
courts than patent or other intellectual property cases.46  The United 
Kingdom’s Ministry of Justice stated that there were 95 trade secret cases in 
2009 compared to 146 trademark cases, 130 patent cases, and 120 copyright 
cases.47  Further, the European Commission was more concerned with 
encouraging competition than securing the rights of companies regarding 
trade secrets.48  Thus, even though there were trade secret standards around 
the EU, the standards were ignored which led to weak trade secret protection 
measures.49  
The present disjunction in trade secret protection causes concern because 
it leads to barriers to trade and distortion of competition.50  For instance, 
various jurisdictions refer to trade secrets using different terms including: 
know-how, confidential information, or business secret.51  There is little 
agreement as to the meanings of each these terms, which can create 
confusion as to what qualifies as a trade secret.52  Further, different countries 
may deem the theft of trade secrets as a civil or criminal offense or both.53 
For instance, in France, the criminal code has had provisions related to the 
theft of trade secrets since 1844.54  On the other hand, Ireland and the U.K. 
do not have any criminal provisions on trade secret infringement.55  
Moreover, some EU member states lack any remedy for trade-secret theft.56  
                                                                                                                   
 44 Sosnova, supra note 8, at 47.  
 45 Katarzyna A. Czapracka, Antitrust and Trade Secrets: The U.S. and the EU Approach, 24 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 207, 208–09 (2008). 
 46 HOGAN LOVELLS INT’L, LLP, REPORT ON TRADE SECRETS FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: 
STUDY ON TRADE SECRETS AND PARASITIC COPYING (LOOK-ALIKES), at 41, MARKT/2010/20/D 
(Sept. 23, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/trade-secrets/120113_ 
study_en.pdf [hereinafter REPORT]. 
 47 Id.  
 48 Czapracka, supra note 45, at 209.  
 49 Id.   
 50 Id. at 229.  
 51 Id. at 230.  
 52 Id. at 231.  
 53 Id.  
 54 Id.  
 55 Id. at 213, 234. 
 56 Frequently Asked Questions: Protection Against the Unlawful Acquisition of Undisclosed 
Know-how Business Information (Trade Secrets), EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/gro 
wth/industry/intellectual-property/trade-secrets/faq_en (last visited Oct. 5, 2016) [hereinafter 
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There are also differences in national legislation as to why a person may 
bring a claim for the theft of a trade secret. Only Germany and Poland 
require that a trade secret holder “have a justifiable interest to keep the 
information secret, which is assessed in relation to the relevance of the 
subject of the secret for the competitiveness of the enterprise.”57   
Additionally, there are differences in legal procedures.  For instance, 
Belgium requires a written pleading communicating that the information is a 
trade secret, which serves as a deterrent for those seeking to bring a trade 
secret action unless the information is already generally known.58  Belgium 
illustrates that there is a dearth of protection from the disclosure of trade 
secrets in the courts of European Union member States. 
Though there is widespread fragmentation, some similarities exist among 
those countries that do have trade secret laws in the EU.  In general, the 
information is required to be secret, and the owner is required to maintain 
efforts to keep the information secret.59  If a third party can easily discover 
the information, it is not protectable.60  The trade secret owner should intend 
to maintain the secrecy of the information.61  Finally, there must be a link 
between the trade secret and an economic advantage.62  The trade secret does 
not need to be patentable, although some jurisdictions do require the trade 
secret to be “novel.”63 
Key elements of a trade secret include the confidentiality of information 
and the owner’s efforts to maintain the secrecy of the information.64  
Countries that do not formally define “trade secret” use a multitude of factors 
to determine if the information is a trade secret.65  Only one country has 
legislation wholly dedicated to trade secrets, whereas some jurisdictions 
protect trade secrets using the law of unfair competition.66  Most countries 
                                                                                                                   
Frequently Asked Questions].  Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
and Sweden have legislation on the misappropriation of trade secrets, though Germany, Finland, 
Greece, Denmark, and Spain do not define “trade secret.” Id.  Belgium, France, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, and the U.K. have no specific provision on trade secrets in 
state law. Id.  In Cyprus, trade secrets are only protected by contract. Id.  In France, the theft of 
manufacturing secrets are criminally punished if committed by employees. Id. 
 57 Czapracka, supra note 45, at 234. 
 58 REPORT, supra note 46.  
 59 Czapracka, supra note 45, at 234. 
 60 Id. at 234–35. 
 61 Id. at 235. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 234–35.  
 64 REPORT, supra note 46. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
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have criminal sanctions against trade secret infringement and provide for the 
protection of trade secrets by contractual obligations.67  While most states 
offer injunctions and damages, the remedies vary from state to state 
depending on the cause of action.68  Further, some countries do not issue 
orders protecting trade secret information because the protection can last 
forever, thereby broadening intellectual property rights.69  Finally, it has 
historically been difficult for plaintiffs to get into the court because claimants 
could not prove that the information was stolen.70  
The European Commission created a directive partially due to a recent 
study showing that 75% of companies stated that trade secrets are important 
for competitiveness and innovative performance.71  The lack of consistent 
trade secret laws discourages cross-border research and development; 
companies refrain from sharing trade secrets; and few companies seek legal 
remedies after they are a victim of trade secret misappropriation.72  The 
statistics indicated that it was clearly time for a change in the European 
Union.  The European Commission cited company requests for coherent 
legal protection against the unlawful acquisition of trade secrets as a primary 
reason for the legislation.73  Further, in the past ten years, one in five 
European companies suffered from at least one misappropriation attempt,74 
and many of those respondents likely did not seek redress because of 
fragmentation in trade secret laws.  These companies also indicated that the 
danger of misappropriation was increasing.75  Of the 140 companies that 
reported attempts or acts of misappropriation, only 40.7% sought remedies in 
EU courts.76  The primary reasons for failing to do so were collecting 
evidence, reputation, and litigation costs.77 
                                                                                                                   
 67 Id. 
 68 Id.  
 69 Id.  
 70 Id.   
 71 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 56. 
 72 Id.  
 73 Id.  
 74 Study on Trade Secrets and Confidential Business Information in the Internal Market, 13 
(Apr. 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/trade-secrets/130711_fi 
nal-study_en.pdf [hereinafter Study]. These responses were based on a survey with “a 
stratified sample encompassing large, medium, and small firms belonging to a wide range of 
business sectors.” Id. at 12.  Overall, a total of 537 responses to the survey were received from 
EU firms. Id.  
 75 Id. at 13. 
 76 Id.  
 77 Id.  Of 140 companies surveyed, 43% stated difficulty in collecting evidence, 30% stated 
reputation, and 30% stated reputation costs.    
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Though each jurisdiction has unique trade secret laws, there are basic 
principles that apply to all EU states.  First, several different types of 
information are eligible for trade secret protection.78  Many states do not 
include definitions in their trade secrets legislation, though it is generally 
understood to mean information including technical or non-technical data, 
patterns, compilations, programs, devices, methods, techniques, financial 
data, customer lists, or supplies that have economic value as the information 
is not generally known to third parties and secrecy is maintained due to the 
owner’s efforts.79  
III.  OVERVIEW OF THE TRADE SECRETS DIRECTIVE AND DEFEND TRADE 
SECRETS ACT 
The European Commission proposed the Trade Secrets Directive on 
November 28, 2013, and on June 8, 2016 the European Union adopted the 
Directive.80  The Directive requires all member states to create legislation 
that aligns with the Directive within two years from the adoption date.81  The 
Directive is “applicable when the appropriation, use or disclosure of trade 
secrets is done without the consent of the trade secret holder and through the 
use of dishonest means, breach of law, or breach of contract.”82  Further, it is 
important for companies “from different EU countries to build trusted 
networks for collaborative research or to enter into know-how transfer 
agreements” which can only be done by repairing the fragmented system of 
trade secret laws.83  
A.  European Union Trade Secrets Directive 
On June 8, 2016, the European Parliament and Council adopted a 
Directive called Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on 8 June 2016 on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and 
Business Information (Trade Secrets) Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, 
Use, and Disclosure (Trade Secrets Directive).84  The rationale behind the 
                                                                                                                   
 78 REPORT, supra note 46. 
 79 Id.  
 80 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 56. 
 81 See Directive 2016/943, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 
on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and Business Information (Trade Secrets) 
Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, Use and Disclosure 2016 O.J. (L 157) 18 [hereinafter 
Trade Secrets Directive]. 
 82 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 56. 
 83 Id.  
 84 Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81.  
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Trade Secrets Directive was to limit European companies’ increasing 
exposure to the misappropriation of trade secrets.85  The Directive does not 
establish criminal sanctions, but harmonizes the civil remedies available to a 
trade secret owner including:  
stopping the unlawful use and further disclosure of 
misappropriated trade secrets[;] the removal from the market of 
goods that have been manufactured on the basis of a trade 
secret that has been illegally acquired[;] the right to 
compensation for the damages caused by the unlawful use or 
disclosure of the misappropriated trade secret.86 
The Directive dictates that a trade secret has three components.  First, it 
should be a secret that is not generally known or readily accessible by people 
that usually deal with the information in question.87  Second, it should have 
commercial value derived from the fact that it is a secret.88  Finally, the trade 
secret holder should have taken reasonable steps to protect the secrecy of the 
information.89  
The Directive prohibits the unlawful acquisition, use, and disclosure of 
trade secrets.  It is unlawful for a person to use or disclose a trade secret if 
they know or should have known that the trade secret was obtained directly 
or indirectly from another person who unlawfully used or disclosed the trade 
secret.90 
The Directive also provides for the preservation of confidentiality of trade 
secrets in the course of legal proceedings.  Member states must take specific 
measures that are necessary to preserve the confidentiality of any trade secret 
or alleged trade secret used or referred to in the course of legal proceedings.91  
These protections include: restricting access to any document containing 
trade secrets, restricting access to hearings when trade secrets may be 
disclosed, limiting access to only certain people, and limiting a non-
confidential version of a judicial decision to only a specified number of 
persons.92  The number of persons is limited to what is necessary to ensure 
the right to an effective remedy and fair trial and must include at least one 
                                                                                                                   
 85 Id. at 3.  
 86 Trade Secrets, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/intellectual-proper 
ty/trade-secrets_en (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).  
 87 Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 2.  
 88 Id. at 4. 
 89 Id. at 7. 
 90 Id. at 10. 
 91 Id. at 5–6. 
 92 Id. at 6. 
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natural person from each party and their respective lawyers.93  Exceptions to 
trade secret protections occur when secrets are exposed as the result of 
whistleblowing, conflicting with the right to freedom of expression, or when 
the protections conflict with the functions of workers’ representatives.94 
B.  United States Defend Trade Secrets Act 
On May 11, 2016, President Obama signed Public Law 114-153.  The 
Public Law, which amends Chapter 90 of Title 18 of the United States Code 
(Economic Espionage Act), is called the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 
(DTSA).95  In a rare showing of bipartisanship, the Senate unanimously 
passed the bill in a vote of 87–0 on April 4, 2016.  The bill passed the House 
410–2.96  Under the DTSA, the owner of a trade secret may bring a civil 
action if the trade secret is misappropriated and the trade secret is related to a 
product or service that is used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign 
commerce.97  President Obama explained that the bill serves to prevent 
competitors from stealing trade secrets from American companies, which 
costs the economy over $300 billion a year.98  The legislation expands the 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996.99  The DTSA enables trade secret owners 
to bring trade secret lawsuits in a federal forum. Previously, owners were 
limited to only state forums or federal courts in diversity.100  
The DTSA is like the UTSA.  The trade secret definition is very similar, 
and the misappropriation definition is identical.101  Both the DTSA and 
UTSA have a three-year statute of limitations following the discovery of 
misappropriation.102  The DTSA does not preempt state law, and federal 
court jurisdiction is not exclusive.103  
                                                                                                                   
 93 Id.   
 94 Id. at 4–5.  
 95 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016).  
 96 REUTERS, Congress Just Passed Tough New Trade Secret Protection Legislation, 
FORTUNE (Apr. 28, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/28/congress-trade-secret-legislation/. 
 97 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1) (2016).  
 98 Gregory Korte, Obama Signs Trade Secrets Bill, Allowing Companies to Sue, USA 
TODAY (May 11, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/05/11/obama-sign 
s-trade-secrets-bill-allowing-companies-sue/84244258/. 
 99 Eric Goldman, The New ‘Defend Trade Secrets Act’ Is the Biggest IP Development in 
Years, FORBES (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2016/04/28/the-new-
defend-trade-secrets-act-is-the-biggest-ip-development-in-years/#7946ea00a64f. 
 100 Id.; see also ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 13.02 (2015). 
 101 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(i) (amended 1985).  
 102 See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(d); Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 6 (amended 1985). 
 103 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (2016). 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2018  9:21 AM 
2018] SHHH! IT’S A SECRET 493 
 
However, the DTSA is also distinct from the UTSA in multiple ways.  
First, the trade secret must satisfy the commerce clause, meaning that the 
trade secret must be related to a product or service use in or intended for use 
in interstate or foreign commerce.104  Second, the DTSA allows for ex parte 
civil seizure.105  Third, the DTSA grants whistleblower immunity.106  Fourth, 
the U.S. legislation requires employers to give notice of whistleblower 
immunity, and finally, it applies to activity outside the United States.107 
IV.  COMPARISON OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TRADE SECRETS DIRECTIVE 
AND THE UNITED STATES DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT 
Both the European Union and the United States decided to implement 
these trade secret measures because of the growing importance of trade 
secret protection in the global economy.  The nature of trade secrets requires 
a common definition and protections, especially as trade secret 
misappropriation is litigated in court.  
Overall, the DTSA is comparable to the European Union Trade Secrets 
Directive.  Both have similar definitions of a trade secret with three 
requirements.  First, the information must be a secret meaning that it is not 
generally known.  The U.S. definition states that the information should not 
be known to another person who can derive economic value from the 
information,108 whereas the EU only requires that the information should not 
be known within circles that deal with the kind of information in question.109  
Second, the trade secret must have economic or commercial value.110  
Finally, in order to be a trade secret, the owner or controller of the 
information must take efforts to prevent others from obtaining the trade 
secret information.111  
In order for a trade secret to be misappropriated, both the DTSA and the 
Directive require either wrongful acquisition, use, or disclosure.112  Wrongful 
acquisition occurs if someone acquires the trade secret information through 
unauthorized access.  The DTSA describes this as “theft, bribery, 
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain 
                                                                                                                   
 104 Id. § 1832(a).  
 105 Id. § 1836(b). 
 106 Id. § 1833(b); id. § 1837. 
 107 Id. § 1837. 
 108 Id. § 1839(3)(B). 
 109 Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 4. 
 110 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 9.  
 111 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 9.  
 112 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 10. 
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secrecy, or espionage.”113  Both acts also state that the acquisition, use, or 
disclosure of a trade secret is unlawful if one obtains the trade secret with 
knowledge that the information was obtained from another person who was 
using or disclosing the trade secret unlawfully.114  However, a person is 
shielded from liability if he or she obtains the information without 
knowledge that it was wrongfully acquired, according to both the DTSA and 
the Directive.115 
Wrongful use or disclosure occurs if one of three criteria are met.  First, 
wrongful use occurs if a person acquires a trade secret improperly or 
unlawfully.116  It can also occur if a person obtains a trade secret despite a 
duty to not disclose the secret, or, in other words, if a person has an 
obligation to keep the information confidential or a duty to limit the trade 
secret’s use.117  Third, wrongful use or disclosure can occur if a person 
knowingly obtains a trade secret from a person who owed a duty to maintain 
a trade secret’s confidentiality or limit its use.118  
While both the DTSA and Directive seek to prevent the misappropriation 
of trade secrets, both the United States and EU strive to maintain innovation.  
As such, both pieces of legislation also define lawful means to acquire trade 
secret information.  The United States explicitly allows for reverse 
engineering.119  Though the Directive does not explicitly use the words 
“reverse engineering,” it does allow for “observation, study, disassembly or 
testing of a product or object that has been made available to the public or 
that is lawfully in the possession of the acquirer of the information who is 
free from any legally valid duty to limit the acquisition of the trade secret.”120  
Though the difference is subtle, the DTSA does not address whether a person 
with access to the trade secret information could “reverse engineer” an item.  
Further, both the DTSA and Directive allow for any independent discovery, 
creation, or derivation of the trade secret information.121  This means that if a 
person, through their own testing methods, developed an identical recipe for 
Coca-Cola, the acquisition of that trade secret would be lawful.   
The Directive goes a step further than the DTSA as to what types of trade 
secret disclosures are lawful.  The Directive states that it does not apply to 
those who exercise the right to freedom of expression and information as set 
                                                                                                                   
 113 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(A). 
 114 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)(B); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 6–7. 
 115 See 130 Stat. 376; Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 6–7. 
 116 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)(A); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 10.  
 117 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)(B)(ii)(II); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 10. 
 118 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)(B)(ii)(III); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 10. 
 119 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(B).  
 120 Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 10. 
 121 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(B); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 4. 
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out in the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights.122  It is not clear 
what the freedom of expression and information covers; however, the text of 
the Directive indicates that the Directive intends to protect “investigative 
journalism and the protection of journalistic sources.”123  The Directive also 
allows for the acquisition, use, or disclosure of trade secrets if such action is 
permitted by law.124  In particular, this provision applies to unions.  Union 
representatives should still be able to exercise their rights to information 
according to the EU or the national laws of EU countries.125 
Both regimes also allow for whistleblower protections, though again, the 
Directive provides broader protections for whistleblowers.  The DTSA only 
protects a whistleblower if he discloses a trade secret “in confidence to a 
Federal, State, or local government official, either directly or indirectly, or to 
an attorney.”126  The Directive protects any disclosure that “serves the public 
interest” meaning the disclosure reveals “misconduct, wrongdoing, or illegal 
activity.”127 The EU also allows for good faith immunity for whistleblowers 
so long as they believe that they revealed misconduct, wrongdoing, or illegal 
activity in furtherance of the public interest.128 
Both the United States and EU also seek to protect employees through 
their respective legislation.  The DTSA prohibits injunctions that prevent 
someone from entering into an employment relationship.129  In addition, if a 
person has conditions placed on entering into an employment relationship, 
those conditions can only be based on evidence of threatened 
misappropriation, not solely an employee’s knowledge.130  Additionally, 
conditions may not conflict with applicable state law that may prohibit 
restraints on “the practice of a lawful profession, trade, or business.”131  The 
Directive provides even stronger protections for employees.  First, the 
                                                                                                                   
 122 Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 5. 
 123 Id.  
 124 Id. at 4.  
 125 Id.  
The acquisition, use, or disclosure of trade secrets, whenever imposed or 
permitted by law, should be treated as lawful for the purposes of this 
Directive.  This concerns, in particular, the acquisition and disclosure of trade 
secrets in the context of the exercise of the rights of workers’ representatives 
to information, consultation, and participation in accordance with Union law 
and national laws and practices, and the collective defen[s]e of the interest of 
workers and employees.  
 126 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1)(A)(i).  
 127 Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 5.  
 128 Id. at 11.  
 129 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I). 
 130 Id.  
 131 Id. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(II). 
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Directive points out that it should not be used as a method to limit an 
employee’s use of information that is not a trade secret.132  Next, the 
Directive should not be used to limit an employee’s use of experience and 
skills that were acquired throughout their course of employment.133  Finally, 
the Directive should not be used to impose additional restrictions on an 
employment contract, unless that restriction is imposed according to EU or 
national law.134 
The DTSA also provides anti-retaliation protection while the Directive 
does not.  The DTSA states that an individual may disclose a trade secret 
after filing a lawsuit for retaliation by an employer if certain conditions are 
met.135  The employee must file any document under seal and cannot disclose 
the trade secret unless ordered by a court.136  Further, employers are required 
to provide employees with notice of immunity.137 
The laws diverge with regard to who can bring a claim for trade secret 
misappropriation. The DTSA only allows for the owner to bring a claim.138  
The Directive extends more broadly by allowing one who controls the 
information to bring such a claim.139  Because the Directive applies to those 
who control information, those in upper-level managerial positions may be 
entitled to bring trade secret claims, in lieu of just the person that owns the 
proprietary information. The broader standing for those who control 
information may also include licensees of trade secret information. 
The DTSA gives U.S. courts jurisdiction over conduct occurring outside 
of the United States, as long as the person who misappropriated the 
information is a U.S. citizen or entity.140  The Directive does not specify 
whether it applies to extraterritorial conduct; however, EU member states 
will likely be able to provide for broader national reach in their own national 
laws.  
Recognizing the importance of trade secrets, both the DTSA and 
Directive seek to preserve the confidentiality of a trade secret throughout 
litigation.  This is a key factor that will encourage parties to bring trade 
secret claims—otherwise, the legislation in both the United States and EU 
would be futile.  In the United States, the trade secret owner must be given 
the opportunity to describe their interest in keeping information confidential 
                                                                                                                   
 132 Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 9. 
 133 Id.   
 134 Id.  
 135 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(2). 
 136 Id. § 1833(b)(2)(B). 
 137 Id. § 1833(b)(3)(A). 
 138 Id. § 1836(b)(1).  
 139 Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 9. 
 140 18 U.S.C. § 1837. 
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before the court is able to authorize or direct disclosure of any information 
that the owner asserts to be a trade secret.141  The Directive provides greater 
detail about confidentiality measures.  The Directive identifies specific 
baseline measures that a court should consider to preserve confidentiality.142  
These measures include restricting access to documents containing trade 
secrets, restricting access to hearings where trade secrets may be disclosed 
and corresponding transcripts, and limiting the number of people who can 
access a non-confidential version of a judicial decision.143  
The Directive also outlines factors that judicial authorities should 
consider to determine which protective measures should be implemented.144  
These eight factors are: (1) the value of trade secret; (2) the measures taken 
to protect the trade secret; (3) the conduct used to acquire and to use the trade 
secret; (4) the impact of unlawful use or disclosure of trade secret; (5) the 
interest of parties; (6) the interests of third parties; (7) the public interest; 
and, (8) the need to safeguard fundamental rights.145  Finally, the Directive 
offers more specificity about who has access to information during legal 
proceedings.  In a trade secret proceeding, one natural person from each 
party and their respective lawyers will have full access to evidence or 
hearings.146  The DTSA provides no such specificity.  Finally, the Directive 
addresses the publication of judicial decisions after the case has been 
decided.147  In any legal proceeding concerning the unlawful acquisition, use, 
or disclosure of a trade secret, judicial authorities may order the 
dissemination of information concerning the decision, which includes 
publishing the decision in full or in part.148  Any publication must preserve 
the confidentiality of trade secrets.149  The infringer bears the cost for 
“dissemination of the information concerning the decision, including 
publishing it in full or in part.”150  A court must take into account “the value 
of the trade secret, the conduct of the infringer in acquiring, using or 
disclosing the trade secret, the impact of the unlawful use or disclosure of the 
trade secret, and the likelihood of further unlawful use or disclosure of the 
trade secret by the infringer.”151  The Directive also aims to provide some 
                                                                                                                   
 141 Id.  
 142 Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 5.  
 143 Id. at 6.  
 144 Id. at 13.  
 145 Id. at 14.  
 146 Id. at 6. 
 147 Id. at 17.   
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protection to the infringer if the information in the publication of the decision 
would allow a natural person to be identified.152  In particular, the court will 
take into account whether publication of the identifying information is 
justified because the publication may cause harm to the privacy and 
reputation of the infringer. 
Both documents also allow for similar remedies for trade secret 
misappropriation.  Remedies can be either temporary or permanent.  
Temporary remedies include the seizure of property and preliminary 
injunctions.  Both the DTSA and Directive allow for the seizure of infringing 
goods.153  The EU defines infringing goods as goods whose design, 
characteristics, functioning, manufacturing, and process of marketing 
significantly benefit from trade secrets unlawfully acquired, used, or 
disclosed.154  The DTSA is unique from the Directive because it allows for 
the ex parte seizure of property necessary to prevent the propagation or 
dissemination of the trade secret only upon the proper showing by the trade 
secret owner.155  Ex parte seizure only occurs in extraordinary circumstances, 
and the trade secret owner must post bond.156  The Directive does not state 
whether the seizure of infringing goods can be done ex parte.  Further, the 
DTSA allows for the seizure of any property “necessary to prevent the 
propagation or dissemination of the trade secret,”157 whereas the Directive 
only allows for the seizure of infringing goods.158  The seizure of property 
under the DTSA is broader because it pertains to any documents that may 
include trade secret information; whereas infringing goods are only those 
produced using the trade secret itself.  
Other temporary forms of relief in the EU and United States include 
preliminary injunctions.  The Directive specifically requires EU states to 
allow “prohibition, offering, placing on the market or use of infringing 
goods” under the sub-title of “Provisional and Precautionary measures.”159  
The DTSA does not explicitly mention preliminary injunctions, however, an 
ex parte seizure can only be ordered if equitable relief under Rule 65 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is inadequate.160  This implies that 
preliminary injunctions are a form of relief for trade secret misappropriation.  
The Directive specifies that a court should take into account the eight factors 
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 153 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 13. 
 154 Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 9. 
 155 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i). 
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described above before issuing a preliminary injunction.161  A plaintiff must 
meet the requirements for a preliminary injunction.162   
Both the EU and the United States include limitations on preliminary 
relief through bonds and time limitations.  In the United States, an ex parte 
seizure order or preliminary injunction requires the movant to post a bond.163  
Similarly, in the EU, a movant may be required to post a security to ensure 
that the respondent is compensated for any prejudice.164  Both jurisdictions 
also impose time limits for judicial action for more permanent measures.165  
In the EU, an applicant must institute legal proceedings leading to a decision 
on the merits within either twenty working days or thirty-one calendar days, 
whichever is longer.166  In the United States, after an ex parte seizure order, 
the court must set a date for a hearing no later than seven days after the order 
is issued, unless there is consent from the respondent to delay.167 
The DTSA places particular emphasis on the criteria surrounding the 
seizure of property related to the trade secret.  If a trade secret has been 
misappropriated, a court can issue an order for the civil seizure of property 
necessary to prevent the propagation or dissemination of information that is 
the subject of the action.168  In order to issue a civil seizure, the court must 
find that another form of equitable relief would be inadequate, an immediate 
and irreparable injury will occur if the seizure is not ordered, and the harm of 
denying the seizure outweighs the harm to the legitimate interests of the 
person against whom seizure would be ordered and substantially outweighs 
the harm to any third parties who may be harmed by such seizure.169  The 
court must also find that the applicant is likely to show that the information 
is a trade secret and that the person against whom seizure would be ordered 
misappropriated the trade secret of the applicant by improper means or 
conspired to use improper means to misappropriate the trade secret, and that 
                                                                                                                   
 161 Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 15. 
 162 See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008).  In order to obtain a 
preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show that “he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he 
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 164 Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 14. 
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 166 Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 14. 
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the person against whom the seizure would be ordered has actual possession 
of the trade secret.170 
After the seizure, any materials seized will be taken into the custody of 
the court, and the court shall secure the seized material from physical and 
electronic access during the seizure and while in the court’s custody.171  If 
the seized material includes a storage medium or is stored on a storage 
medium, the medium will not be connected to a network or the Internet 
without the consent of both parties.172  The court will take appropriate 
measures to protect the confidentiality of seized materials that are unrelated 
to the trade secret information ordered seized, unless the person against 
whom the order is entered consents to disclosure of the material.173  Finally, 
“[t]he court may appoint a special master to locate and isolate all 
misappropriated trade secret information and to facilitate the return of 
unrelated property and data to the person from whom the property was 
seized.”174  In addition, the special master will be bound by a non-disclosure 
agreement approved by the court.175 
A finding of trade secret misappropriation can also result in monetary 
damages.176  These monetary damages can come in three forms.  First, they 
may equate to lost profits.177  Second, the damages can reflect unjust 
enrichment.178  Third, monetary damages can be in the amount of a 
reasonable royalty that may have been due had the trade secret been licensed 
for use.179  However, in the EU, if an employee does not act with intent, 
member states have the ability to limit employees’ damages.180  The 
Directive does not explicitly address punitive damages, but the DTSA allows 
for punitive damages up to twice the amount awarded if the misappropriation 
was willful and malicious.181  
On the other hand, if a court finds that a plaintiff brought a trade secret 
misappropriation claim in bad faith, both the DTSA and Directive provide 
for specific sanctions.  In the United States, the defendant may be awarded 
                                                                                                                   
 170 Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(V)(aa).  
 171 Id. § 1836(b)(2)(D)(i). 
 172 Id. § 1836(b)(2)(D)(ii). 
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 176 Id. § 1836(b)(3)(B)(i)–(ii); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 7. 
 177 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(B)(i)(I); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 7. 
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attorney’s fees if a claim is brought in bad faith.182  Further, if a defendant 
opposed a motion to terminate an injunction in bad faith, the DTSA may 
award attorney’s fees to the plaintiff.183  Similarly, the Directive allows for 
individual member states to impose sanctions on a plaintiff or award 
damages to the defendant.184  
In addition to monetary damages, judicial authorities can award 
permanent equitable relief.  When there has been an unlawful acquisition, 
use, or disclosure of a trade secret, a European court has a few options.  It 
may order:  
(a) the cessation of or . . . the prohibition of the use or 
disclosure of the trade secret; (b) the prohibition of production, 
offering, placing on the market or use of infringing goods, or 
the importation, export, or storage of infringing goods for these 
purposes; (c) the adoption of the appropriate corrective 
measures with regard to the infringing goods; [or] (4) the 
destruction of all or part of any document, object, material, 
substance or electronic file containing or embodying the trade 
secret or, where appropriate, the delivery up to the applicant of 
all or part of those documents, objects, materials, substances, or 
electronic files.185   
In the United States, permanent relief includes an injunction.186  Both 
jurisdictions allow for the payment of a reasonable royalty in lieu of an 
injunction.187 However, the United States permits this only in exceptional 
circumstances, and the EU allows this only when conditions are met 
including lack of intent, disproportionate harm, or if the royalty appears 
satisfactory.188 
Though the remedies in both the EU and United States are similar, the EU 
provides guidelines for revoking these remedies.  The first is failure to 
institute legal proceedings.189  Temporary remedies can also be removed if 
there is no unlawful acquisition, use, or disclosure found.190  Both temporary 
and permanent remedies can be revoked at the request of the respondent if 
                                                                                                                   
 182 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(D).  
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 184 Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 16. 
 185 Id. at 15.  
 186 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A). 
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the information is no longer a trade secret for reasons not attributable to the 
respondents.191 
A fundamental difference between the two regimes is seen in regards to 
criminal liability.  Although not a part of the DTSA, the United States allows 
for potential criminal liability for wrongful acquisition, use, or disclosure 
under the Economic Espionage Act.192  Remedies include fines, forfeiture of 
property, destruction of property, restitution to victim, and imprisonment.193  
There is no criminal liability under the Directive.  However, individual 
member states may choose to have more “far-seeking protection” and enact 
criminal sanctions within their own jurisdiction that are aligned with the 
protections dictated by the Directive.194  
Another issue that will be determined by individual states in the EU is the 
statute of limitations.  The United States statute of limitations period only 
lasts three years after the date on which the misappropriation is discovered or 
should have been discovered.195  The Directive merely specifies that the 
statute of limitations should not exceed six years.196  Each state will be able 
to tailor the statute of limitations to a period shorter than six years.197  States 
will also be able to specify when the statute of limitations begins to run.198  
The DTSA grants federal courts jurisdiction over conduct that occurs 
outside of the United States, which is not present in the Directive.199  
However, the Directive only dictates a minimum level of protection so EU 
states can choose to have their trade secrets legislation apply to conduct 
outside of their territory, like the DTSA.   
Both the EU and the United States also seem committed to ensuring that 
the DTSA and Directive are properly implemented.  In the Directive, the 
European Commission cited certain requirements for member states.  First, 
each member state is required to appoint at least one national correspondent 
“for any question relation to the implementation of the measures provided for 
by [the] Directive.”200  The national correspondents are required to 
communicate details to other member states and the European Commission 
regarding how their country is implementing the measures required by the 
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Directive.201  Further, the European Union seems committed to monitoring 
the effects of the Directive.  The European Union Intellectual Property 
Office must prepare a report on the litigation trends “regarding the unlawful 
acquisition, use or disclosure of trade secrets pursuant to” the Directive.202  
Then, by June 2022, the European Commission must submit an intermediate 
report on the application of the Directive to the European Parliament and 
Council.203  The purpose of that report is to analyze the effects of the 
Directive on “research and innovation, the mobility of employees and on the 
exercise of the right to freedom of expression and information.”204  The 
European Commission will submit a final report evaluating the impact of the 
Directive to the European Parliament and Council by June 9, 2026.205  After 
member states implement “laws, regulations, and administrative provisions” 
necessary to comply with the Directive, they must communicate the text of 
the measures to the European Commission.206  The measures should also 
contain reference to the Directive.207  In the United States, two years after the 
DTSA’s enactment, the Federal Judicial Center is required to develop 
recommended best practices.208  These best practices concern “the seizure of 
information and media storing the information and the securing of 
information and media once seized.”209  Further, those best practices have to 
be updated periodically.210  
V.  EFFECT OF LEGISLATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES 
Despite the similarities between the two pieces of legislation, the effects 
will prove to be drastically different in each regime.  The implementation of 
the DTSA will likely experience few hurdles, primarily because of the 
United States’ strong history of protecting trade secrets through the UTSA.  
On the other hand, there will be greater challenges with implementation in 
the EU for two reasons.  First, effective implementation will require 
coordination between countries.  Second, there are unanswered questions 
surrounding the Directive.  
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A.  Implementation and Effects of the Trade Secrets Directive in the 
European Union  
To begin with, the effects of the DTSA and the Directive will differ 
because of the nature of the documents.  The DTSA is U.S. legislation, 
whereas the EU document is a directive.  As such, the Directive does not 
have the same binding effect as the DTSA.  A directive is a “legislative act 
that sets out a goal that all EU countries must achieve.”211  If the document 
was a “regulation,” it would serve as a binding legislative act applicable to 
the entire EU.212  However, with a directive, the EU defines a set of 
standards that each country should then implement.  The Directive allows 
flexibility regarding statute of limitations and criminal liability.213  This 
flexibility, in turn, will lead to stronger trade secret protection in some 
countries.   
Across the board, trade secret litigation is bound to increase in the EU; 
however, the increased litigation will raise unanswered questions.214  Though 
the Directive does not explicitly address jurisdictional issues, these will often 
arise in the Directive’s implementation.  Generally, domicile of the 
defendant determines jurisdiction.215  Historically, this likely served as a 
deterrent for trade secret claims because if the defendant lived in a state that 
did not offer trade secret protection, the trade secret owner was better off not 
bringing the claim at all because of the risk that the trade secret would be 
revealed during the litigation process.  In the EU, a plaintiff can bring a 
claim related to a contractual obligation in the place of performance of that 
obligation.216  Because of the Directive, any employee who was obliged to 
preserve a trade secret as part of their employment contract is now subject to 
suit in their former state of employment.  Thus, if an employee 
misappropriates a trade secret and then moves to a new country, they will 
still be subject to a civil suit.  The amount of trade secret litigation is likely to 
increase in nations that are more developed and industrial than others; for 
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instance, Germany will likely see an increase in trade secret litigation.  If a 
trade secret owner brings any action for damages, the courts of the state 
where the harmful event occurred can hear the case.217  However, the place 
where the event giving rise to the liability occurred may differ from the place 
where the event results in damage—for instance, if a trade secret is stolen in 
Germany and then used in Latvia, an issue will arise as to which is the 
harmful event—the actual theft or the use.  The EU guidelines state that if 
the events giving rise to liability in tort occurred in different states, the 
plaintiff is free to choose a court from those member states.218  Facially, this 
guideline will not increase forum shopping as litigants in the EU will know 
that they will receive a minimal amount of protection regardless of what state 
they litigate in.  The Directive, however, gives countries flexibility to 
harshen provisions, devise criminal sanctions, and modify statutes of 
limitations for trade secret misappropriation.  Thus, if states do not uniformly 
implement the Directive, there may be an increase in forum shopping as it 
relates to trade secrets.  In this case, a plaintiff would be able to argue that 
the harmful effects are widespread because of reduced sales, particularly if 
their products or services are sold in a number of countries.  Plaintiffs will 
likely attempt to devise a strong argument that the harm is far reaching in 
order to obtain jurisdiction in the country that provides the best trade secret 
protection.  
The jurisdictional guidelines do provide some limits: if the trade secret 
relates to immoveable property, the trade secret litigation can only be 
brought in the member state where the property is situated.219  Another 
unknown issue deals with whether trade secrets will be considered under the 
same category as patents and trademarks.  If so, the guidelines provide that in 
matters relating to rights that have been registered such as patents or 
trademarks, the courts of the member state in which the registration has taken 
place are exclusively competent.220  Trade secrets are not registered 
intellectual property; thus, it would only be logical for this constraint to be 
inapplicable to the Directive. 
The Directive may also lead to choice of court agreements in employment 
contracts as parties may have the possibility of choosing the member state 
with jurisdiction.221  If a widespread corporation based in the European 
Union knows that it has trade secret information that is used in multiple 
jurisdictions, the company may choose to have employees sign contracts 
                                                                                                                   
 217 Id.  
 218 Id.  
 219 Id.  
 220 Id.  
 221 Id.  
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2018 9:21 AM 
506  GA. J. INT’L & COMP.  L. [Vol. 46:481 
 
 
dictating where the trade secret misappropriation claim will be litigated to 
receive the most protection or a longer statute of limitations. 
Prior to the Directive, the prospect of bringing a trade secret 
misappropriation claim was costly.  Before even contemplating the costs of 
litigation, a trade secret owner would have to spend time and money to 
identify whether the information was protectable as a trade secret in a 
particular member state.222  After doing so, the enforcement of trade secret 
litigation was difficult and costly to handle.223  Now, however, there is 
uniformity across all member states as to what sort of information is 
protected as a trade secret, reducing the pre-litigation costs.  Further, the 
procedure for maintaining the secrecy of the information is now consistent 
among member states. The decreased costs coupled with the increased 
protection of information throughout the course of litigation will lead to 
many more claims for trade secret misappropriation.  
Most significantly, there were fewer trade secret claims brought in years 
past because the fragmentation in laws created the possibility that a trade 
secret could be leaked during a court proceeding.224  That problem will be 
ameliorated as member states implement legislation guided by the Directive.  
Prior to the Directive, a plaintiff typically had to substantiate his or her claim 
by disclosing the allegedly infringed secret.225  Now, a plaintiff does not have 
to fear this unwanted disclosure.  This will ultimately lead to more trade 
secret claims, particularly from the pharmaceutical, automotive, information 
technology, and chemical companies. Further, it was generally impossible to 
enforce a trade secret against a third party who obtained the information in 
good faith.226  The Directive will allow those claims, though it will limit 
damages.  
The European Union countries will encounter problems in ensuring 
uniform implementation of trade secret legislation.  First, there will be 
problems ensuring that each country is implementing legislation that 
corresponds with other member countries to prevent diverging results.227  
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Another problem will be ensuring that countries are applying their respective 
legislation such that there is uniformity and comparable protection among 
EU states.228  To help alleviate this situation, the European Union has 
recommended that countries meet with each other to discuss their 
legislation.229  Ultimately, however, each country has control over its 
legislation and does not have to follow the actions of another country.  
In response to the issues regarding uniform implementation, the European 
Commission states that member states will receive support services from the 
European Commission and that national best practices will help other 
member states.230  This fact supports the inference that certain countries that 
already have strong trade secret protection will prove to be leaders in the EU.  
A country that already has strong trade secret protection will have less work 
to do to implement the Directive.  Further, since that country has a history of 
strong trade secret protection, others will likely follow their lead. Judicial 
authorities will have the role of ensuring the uniform protection of trade 
secrets.231  A key issue for judicial authorities will be carrying “out a 
proportionate enforcement of the rules and ensuring that there are no material 
divergences among different judicial authorities.”232  This is a vital 
component of the implementation of the Trade Secrets Directive, failure to 
do this may lead to forum shopping.  
Ultimately, the Directive in the EU will do what the UTSA did for the 
states in the United States.  The legal framework will provide greater clarity 
on the remedies available to trade secret owners.  The Directive will also 
lead to deterrence.233  Notably, the Directive provides a greater amount of 
detail than the DTSA.  The Directive contains greater detail regarding 
remedies for trade secret misappropriation, factors courts should take into 
consideration when determining which remedies are appropriate, and steps 
the court should take to ensure confidentiality of the trade secret information.  
The Directive requires more detail than the DTSA because all states in the 
United States have had experience with trade secret claims, and federal 
courts are also experienced with trade secret claims through diversity suits.  
Both the pre-existing guidelines in the UTSA and case law in the United 
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States provide detailed information about trade secret claims, such that the 
information did not need to be included in the DTSA.  In contrast, some 
countries in the EU had no experience with trade secret claims.  As such, 
those countries required more guidance about trade secrets which explains 
why the Directive is far more intricate than the DTSA. 
B.  Implementation and Effects of the Defend Trade Secrets Act in the United 
States  
While the Directive will have a profound impact on trade secret litigation 
in the EU, trade secret litigation in the United States will remain largely the 
same.  Though a primary rationale in favor of enacting the Defend Trade 
Secrets Act was that it would lead to state law uniformity,234 the new federal 
legislation will likely have little effect on uniformity.  First, a majority of 
states already have uniform approaches to trade secrets litigation because 
forty-eight states have adopted the UTSA.  Though each state has been able 
to modify aspects of the UTSA, the protection of trade secrets was mostly 
the same among the states that adopted the UTSA.235  The definition of 
misappropriation in the DTSA and the UTSA is identical236 so the DTSA 
does not create a revolutionary definition of a trade secret, unlike in Europe 
where many states will have to define a trade secret for the first time.  
Further, the remedial provisions of the DTSA are similar to those that exist 
under state law.237  
The DTSA offers better protection because it allows trade secret claims to 
be heard in either state or federal court.  This is particularly important given 
the time sensitive nature of trade secrets.  First, federal courts in recent years 
have experienced a backlog of cases slowing the time it takes to resolve a 
case.238  The average time to take a civil case through trial in some districts is 
over three years.239  Trade secrets are an important business tool for 
companies, and it is unlikely that a business would want to be involved in 
litigation for years.  Thus, if a company knows that their federal district court 
is experiencing backlog, they will choose to bring the claim in state court.  
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This flexibility allows trade secret owners to have their cases resolved in the 
most expedient way possible.   
The DTSA improves trade secret protection in the United States because 
trade secret owners can choose if they want to bring their claim in federal 
court and avail themselves of certain advantages that only exist in federal 
court.  Federal judges have more experience with intellectual property 
disputes than state court judges given the federal court’s exclusive 
jurisdiction over other forms of intellectual property such as trademarks, 
copyrights, and patents.  Defendants may also prefer federal court because 
initial mandatory disclosures will help weed out false trade secrets claims.  A 
trade secret owner may also want to limit the exposure of their trade secret 
information, given the value and sensitivity of the information.  Federal 
courts provide a better forum for achieving that goal as only one judge 
handles the entire case, limiting the number of people exposed to the 
information.  
The federal court also has broader reach. State trade secret claims do not 
allow for nationwide service of process.  Further, it is more difficult to seek 
discovery across state or national borders in state courts rather than federal 
courts.  Some litigants may choose to bring their claims in federal court to 
take advantage of a less burdensome litigation process. 
Most importantly, however, federal courts offer the option of ex parte 
seizure.  This is a distinct advantage to trade secret owners aiming to protect 
the privacy of their vital business information.  This provision is one that 
many companies will choose to take advantage of, especially given the 
advancement of technology and the ability to disseminate information widely 
and quickly—a trade secret thief need only put information on the internet 
for the potential of immitigable effects.  Imagine if one of the two Coca-Cola 
executives with knowledge of Coca-Cola’s top secret formula goes rogue 
and posts that recipe to the internet or e-mails the recipe to all of the contacts 
in his address book; Coca-Cola would lose its competitive advantage in the 
market.  The very nature of a trade secret is that it is not well known, and 
once that information is widely disseminated, it is no longer a trade secret.  
Aiming to avoid that doomsday scenario, companies will seek to have any 
and all property that may contain the trade secret seized by the court and 
protected until trial.  This remedy is not available in state court and is further 
evidence that the DTSA will lead to a substantial increase in the number of 
trade secret claims heard in federal courts in lieu of state courts. 
It is worth noting that a majority of the trade secret owners who aim to 
take advantage of the ex parte seizure will probably believe that they have a 
viable claim.  The DTSA calls for the trade secret holder to pay a security 
bond that will cover damages in the event the court later finds that the 
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seizure was unnecessary or caused harm.  Because a plaintiff is required to 
provide money at the outset, a plaintiff will not waste money as a means to 
prevent competition.  This provision may help quell concerns about frivolous 
litigation under the DTSA. 
The potential to receive treble damages and attorney’s fees will also 
increase federal trade secret claims.  If a trade secret owner believes that the 
trade secret was misappropriated with intent, as opposed to accidentally, they 
may be more likely to bring the claim in federal court.  The DTSA allows 
exemplary damages of up to two times the amount of damages if the secret is 
willfully and maliciously misappropriated.240 
The statute of limitations is three years for both the UTSA and DTSA.  
This similar statute of limitations will not lead to an increase in federal trade 
secret claims because there is no extra time to bring a claim under the DTSA.  
Similarly, the number of trade secret cases heard in EU countries will also 
increase. Generally, in EU countries, fewer trade secret cases were heard 
relative to patent and other intellectual property cases.241  This low number 
of cases was likely due to a lack of legislation in many countries governing 
trade secret misappropriation.  For now, however, trade secret owners 
recognize that because of the Directive, they will receive a minimum level of 
protection across all countries, thereby increasing the likelihood that a trade 
secret owner may bring a misappropriation claim. 
Finally, the Directive and DTSA will have a significant effect on the 
relations between EU countries and the United States.  Historically, the 
Agreement on Mutual Recognition Between the European Community and 
the United States of America established an agreement on trade secrets such 
that the two regimes agreed to maintain confidentiality of information 
including trade secrets.242  Though this agreement established a right to 
protection, American trade secrets would have received less protection 
because of the weaker trade secret laws in the EU.243  Now, however, 
because the Directive provides more protection in line with prior U.S. 
protection, the agreement carries more weight. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, though the DTSA and Directive have a significant number 
of similarities, ultimately, the results will be far different.  The DTSA will 
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lead to little change in the protection of trade secrets in the United States.  
On the other hand, the impact on the EU will be dramatic.  
The EU is lagging behind the United States in terms of trade secret 
protection.  Whereas the United States has moved to harmonize trade secret 
legislation on a federal level while there is already some protection at the 
state level, the EU Trade Secrets Directive will do for the EU what the 
UTSA did for the United States.  While all EU member countries will have 
some form of trade secret protection, that protection will vary from country 
to country. 
While the United States has a strong history of protecting trade secrets at 
the state level through the UTSA, no such guidance existed in the European 
Union.  Thus, the Directive, in some ways, serves as a guiding document, 
much like the publication of the UTSA did.  There will be problems in 
implementing the EU Trade Secrets Directive and ultimately, the Directive 
will not lead to consistency in trade secret protection.  
There will not be uniform protection because it is up to each country’s 
legislature to design its individual legislation.  Given the history of trade 
secrets, some countries will place more emphasis on the protection of trade 
secrets whereas other countries will let the protections fall by the wayside.  
Further, the Directive provides a great deal of discretion to judicial 
authorities in the protection of trade secrets, especially with regard to 
seizures.  The judges will probably be affected by their past interactions with 
trade secret cases and the general attitudes surrounding the protection of 
trade secrets.  Judges who do not understand the nuances associated with 
trade secrets and the importance they hold are less likely to grant ex parte 
seizures.  This does not differ from the United States where judges will be 
given a significant amount of discretion as well. 
The United States also has stronger trade secret protection because it 
allows for ex parte seizures.  The fact that a seizure can be ex parte is crucial.  
If a trade secret thief is put on notice that they will be taken to court to 
defend against alleged trade secret theft, the thief will be more likely to pull 
the trigger and disseminate the information before they are held legally 
accountable; especially if the trade secret thief is seeking revenge or 
expecting a large amount of monetary compensation.  The EU Directive does 
not specify if seizure can be ex parte which probably means that each 
respective country will be permitted to make this decision.  Again, because 
each country has its own ability to shape its legislation, individual results 
will differ.  
The DTSA also applies to extraterritorial conduct which is important for 
trade secrets that may be misappropriated abroad.  This is particularly 
important as an administration report showed that in many cases of trade 
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secret theft, the purchaser of the trade secret was either the Chinese 
government or a company in China.244  The Directive does not say anything 
about extraterritorial conduct, and each country will have to decide how it 
will treat this type of conduct.  If, however, the legislation does not apply to 
extraterritorial conduct, it will be ineffective.  The trade secret legislation 
only applies to domestic misappropriation; however, given the size of the EU 
and the ease of transportation, it is very easy to transport information across 
country lines.  Thus, to ensure strong protection, it is important that EU 
countries recognize that their legislation should apply to extraterritorial 
conduct.  Again, this variable shows that EU trade secret protection may not 
be as strong because some countries may choose to limit their legislation to 
domestic misappropriation and there will be a lack of uniformity from 
country to country.  
Another factor that supports the argument that trade secret protection is 
stronger in the United States than the EU is the fact that the United States 
imposes criminal liability upon a trade secret thief.  This is particularly 
important at the company level.  Without the risk of criminal liability, a low-
level employee may be inclined to steal a trade secret knowing that if he or 
she is caught, they will only be liable for damages.  However, the low-level 
employee may know that he or she does not have the ability to pay damages, 
so there is no real deterrent.  However, if a low-level employee knows that 
she can face jail time if caught stealing a trade secret, she may think twice 
before conducting the criminal act.  EU states can choose to criminalize trade 
secret misappropriation in each state’s legislation.  Because only some 
countries will likely criminalize trade secret misappropriation, some 
countries in the EU will continue to be known for their strong trade secret 
protection whereas some may lag behind.   
Finally, trade secret protection will remain stronger in the United States 
because opposing parties will not have access to the trade secret information. 
In contrast, in the EU, a party may have access to the information.  This will 
have the effect of leading to false claims of trade secret theft.  For instance, 
Company A may wonder if Company B has any trade secret information.  
Company A could bring a claim for trade secret theft and hedge their bets as 
to whether Company B has any information.  When in court, Company A will 
gain access to Company B’s information.  Essentially, this is a form of 
corporate espionage.  However, major corporations may bear the costs of 
litigation in order to find out information that has even more potential value. 
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Though the EU has taken steps to equalize trade secret protection 
throughout EU countries, there are many variables that will result in 
inconsistent protection, though trade secrets will be better protected than they 
were prior to the Directive.  The trade secret protection in the United States 
will remain strong due to uniform laws and multiple forums to bring 
misappropriation claims arising under those laws.   
